Speeding Up the Pentagon’s Path to Nowhere
In a pointed critique published on DefenseScoop titled “Making the Wrong Things Go Faster at the Department of War,” entrepreneur and innovation expert Steve Blank argues that recent Pentagon efforts to accelerate innovation processes may be exacerbating deep-rooted structural issues rather than resolving them. Drawing on decades of experience advising both Silicon Valley startups and defense initiatives, Blank delivers a sobering assessment of how institutional inertia continues to hinder the Department of Defense’s responsiveness to evolving threats.
At the heart of Blank’s commentary is the accusation that, in its pursuit of speed, the DoD is effectively streamlining outdated acquisition processes rather than implementing the kind of strategic changes necessary for genuine transformation. Rather than correcting the trajectory of its procurement culture, he suggests, the department has simply stepped harder on the gas—accelerating the production of legacy systems and methodologies ill-suited to today’s technological and geopolitical environment.
Blank scrutinizes the role of the Office of Strategic Capital and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), two entities intended to inject agility and venture-style dynamism into military modernization. While their objectives are laudable, he contends they are now largely entangled in the same bureaucratic seams they were meant to disrupt. This, he argues, disconnects defense innovation from the rapid cycle of commercial technological development and global competition, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and autonomous systems.
The article further warns of an institutional mindset that continues to rely on Cold War-era management and acquisition models, often discouraging risk-taking and punishing failure—conditions anathema to the innovation ecosystems from which the DoD hopes to borrow. Blank highlights how traditional defense contractors remain entrenched, with procurement systems designed around multi-year programs and fixed requirements rather than flexible, iterative problem-solving.
A recurring concern in Blank’s analysis is the lack of senior decision-makers with hands-on experience in modern innovation environments. He argues that despite recent additions of advisory boards and outside experts, actual adoption of new approaches within the central acquisition and budgeting systems—including the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process—remains slow or nonexistent. Without sweeping reform, Blank fears that legacy procedures will simply co-opt and neutralize innovation initiatives.
Blank’s criticisms come at a critical juncture for the Pentagon, as challenges from technologically advanced adversaries—including China—continue to mount. Defense leadership frequently speaks of moving “at the speed of relevance,” but Blank questions whether such rhetoric can translate into meaningful structural change without disrupting the power dynamics and incumbent stakeholders that have shielded slow processes from accountability.
Ultimately, the piece on DefenseScoop serves as both a rebuke and a plea—calling on policymakers, military leaders, and technologists to align intentions with substantive reform. Without this, Blank warns, the nation risks accelerating into obsolescence, unable to meet the demands of a rapidly shifting strategic landscape.
